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1976] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
complaining and defending attorneys would be well advised to
prepare strongly developed allegations concerningforum non conve-
niens as well as jurisdictional contacts in framing their pleadings.
ARTICLE 75 - ARBITRATION
CPLR 7502(b): Contract statute of limitations applied to demand for
arbitration.
CPLR 7502(b) permits the statute of limitations to be asserted
as a defense to a demand for arbitration when the defense would
have barred an action on the underlying claim had it been com-
menced in a state court. 1 3 The defense must be asserted promptly
after receipt of a demand for arbitration, for failure to act quickly
may result in a waiver of the defense. 1 4 Although the procedure
for asserting the time-bar defense is well established, the criteria
for determining the statute of limitations applicable to an arbitra-
tion proceeding have been less clearly delineated." 5 Recently, in
Paver & Wildfoerster v. Catholic High School Association,16 the Court
of Appeals held that arbitration will be time barred only if on no
view of the facts could the claim withstand a time-bar challenge in
an action at law. 117
In Paver, the appellant-architects designed and supervised the
construction of the respondent school association's high school.
The contract contained a broad arbitration clause which referred
all future disputes arising under the contract to arbitration. When
the building began to leak, the school association demanded arbi-
113 CPLR 7502(b) provides in pertinent part:
If, at the time that a demand for arbitration was made or a notice of intention to
arbitrate was served, the claim sought to be arbitrated would have been barred by
limitation of time had it been asserted in a court of the state, a party may assert the
limitation as a bar to the arbitration ....
Where compliance with time limitations is a condition precedent to arbitration, the timeliness
of a demand for arbitration will be determined by the court. See Board of Educ. v. Heckler
Elec. Co., 7 N.Y.2d 476, 481-82, 166 N.E.2d 666, 668-69, 199 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652-53 (1960).
114 Service of a demand for arbitration or notice of intention to arbitrate is a common
procedure for the commencement of arbitration proceedings. The demand or notice usually
contains the 20-day preclusion caveat specified in CPLR 7503(c). Failure to move to stay the
arbitration within the allotted 20 days or participation in the arbitration proceedings waives
the defense that ".... a valid agreement was not made or has not been complied with and...
[also waives] the bar of a limitation of time ...." CPLR 7503(c).
I's Compare Naetzker v. Brocton Cent. School Dist., 50 App. Div. 2d 142, 376 N.Y.S.2d
300 (4th Dep't 1975) (applied tort limitation period in barring arbitration of a claim for
architect's malpractice), with In re Three Sofia Bros., 190 Misc. 891, 76 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1947) (applied contract statute of limitations although damagie was caused by
negligence).
116 38 N.Y.2d 669, 345 N.E.2d 565, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). Chief Judge Breitel
authored the majority opinion.117 Id. at 677-78, 345 N.E.2d at 570, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
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tration, contending that the leaks were caused by the architects'
malpractice."t 8 In moving for a stay of arbitration pursuant to
CPLR 7503(b), the architects claimed that the 3-year statute of
limitations for tort malpractice barred arbitration of the school
association's claim."l 9 Noting that the claim sounded both in con-
tract and in tort, the Court of Appeals denied the stay and applied
the longer contract limitation period. 20
In so holding, the Paver Court implicitly overruled a recent
appellate division case, Naetzker v. Brocton Central School District, 12
which bore a striking resemblance to Paver. In Naetzker, architects'
malpractice allegedly resulted in a leak in plaintiff's school build-
ing.122 The appellate division, in affirming the trial court's order
granting the architect's motion for a stay of arbitration, held that
the plaintiff's claim was grounded in malpractice. 23 Consequently,
1'" In 1968, shortly after construction had been substantially completed, respondent
discovered serious leaks in the edifice. Both the architects and builder were notified of the
defects. After several unsuccessful attempts by the builder to correct the problems, an
independent waterproofing company was consulted. In 1973, the respondent, having been
informed by the consultant that the architects were responsible for the leaks, demanded
arbitration pursuant to the contract. Prior to consulting the waterproofer, the association
had had no indication that the architects were at fault. Id. at 672-73, 345 N.E.2d at 566-67,
382 N.Y.S.2d at 22-23.
19 The architects contended that the action was barred by CPLR 214(6) which permits 3
years for the commencement of an action in malpractice. The association simultaneously
commenced an action under CPLR 7503(a) to compel arbitration, claiming that the 6-year
contract limitation period of CPLR 213(2) controlled. The supreme court, on the associa-
tion's motion, consolidated the two proceedings and ordered arbitration. The appellate
division affirmed the lower court's order. 38 N.Y.2d at 671-72, 345 N.E.2d at 566, 382
N.Y.S.2d at 22-23.
120 38 N.Y.2d at 672, 345 N.E.2d at 566, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 23. The dissent, authored by
Judge Cooke and concurred in by Judge Fuchsberg, found the school association's claim to
be time 6 arred. In accepting the architects' contention, the dissent concluded that the
underlying claim was in malpractice. The basis of the dissent's position was that the common
law duty of architects to exercise reasonable care and skill in performing their duties is
identical to the implied contractual obligations of the architects. As a result, no matter how
the claim is labeled, it remains an action in malpractice subject to a 3-year statute of
limitations. Id. at 679, 345 N.E.2d at 571, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 27 (dissenting opinion). See
Naetzker v. Brocton Cent. School Dist., 50 App. Div. 2d 142, 376 N.Y.S.2d 300 (4th Dep't
1975). But see Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953). In
applying the contract period of limitations to an action for breach of implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose, the Blessington Court stated that
although such a breach of duty may rest upon, or be associated with, a tortious act,
it is independent of negligence, and so such a cause of action gets the benefit of the
six year limit . . . as being on an implied contract obligation or liability.
Id. at 147, 111 N.E.2d at 422-23.
121 50 App. Div. 2d 142, 376 N.Y.S.2d 300 (4th Dep't 1975).
122 Id. at 143, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 304. The architects contracted to supervise contruction of
the school district's building. Subsequent to the completion of construction and certification
by the architects, leaks developed. When the school district demanded arbitration, the
architects moved for a stay pursuant to CPLR 7503(b) on the ground that the statute of
limitations had run. Id. at 144, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 304.123 d. at 147, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 305. The court considered application of the statute of
limitations in arbitration cases to be a twofold process: First, characterization of the action to
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the Naetzker court applied the 3-year tort malpractice statute of
limitations and barred the school district's demand for arbitra-
tion.124 In reaching this decision, the Naetzker court applied to
arbitration proceedings the rule developed in Webber v. Herkimer &
Mohawk State Railroad 25 and traditionally applied to actions at
law. 126 In Webber, plaintiff-passenger, who had been injured as a
result of defendant-railroad's alleged negligence, attempted to
bring an action for breach of defendant's implied contractual obli-
gation of due care. The Court of Appeals, however, considered the
"essence" or "reality" of the action rather than its form in deter-
mining the applicable limitation period.' 27 Since the "essence" of
the action in Webber was tortious, the Court utilized the tort statute
of limitations. 28 Although the Paver Court could have adopted this
logic, it refused to be guided by Naetzker, a decision it apparently
believed to be an unwarranted extension of Webber. The Paver Court
readily distinguished Webber and its progeny, noting that these
cases were conventional actions at law, primarily based on personal
injury claims, whereas Paver involved arbitration of a claim for
property damage.' 29 It was the opinion of the Court that in an
arbitration proceeding, the mere fact that a plaintiff could have
based his claim in tort should not preclude an action framed in
contract if the facts would so permit.' 30
It is submitted that the major factor considered in the Paver
Court's rationale was the arbitrator's ability to examine the entire
"complex of facts"'' unrestrained by judicial rules of evidence and
define the proper limitation period; and, second, determination of whether the action
accrued within that period. Concluding that regardless of the allegations involved, it was the
gravamen of the action which controlled the selection of the limitation period, the court
applied the 3-year malpractice statute of limitations. Consequently, since the action was
founded in malpractice and the time of accrual was not within the limitation period, the
court granted the stay of arbitration. Id. at 145-48, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 305-08.124 Id. at 147-48, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 306.
125 109 N.Y. 311, 16 N.E. 358 (1888).
126 See, e.g., Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., 276 N.Y. 259, 264, 11 N.E.2d 902, 904
(1937); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 269 App. Div. 413, 422, 56 N.Y.S.2d 50, 58 (1st Dep't 1945);
Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Hitt, 75 Misc. 2d 565, 570, 348 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1972); Bort v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 58 Misc. 2d 889, 890, 296
N.Y.S.2d 739, 741 (Syracuse City Ct. 1969).
127 109 N.Y. at 314-15, 16 N.E. at 359-60.
'
28 Id. at 314, 16 N.E. at 359.
129 38 N.Y.2d at 675-76, 345 N.E.2d at 569, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 24-25.
130 Id at 676, 345 N.E.2d at 569, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 25-26.
" See id. at 677, 345 N.E.2d at 570, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 26. Arbitrators determine the
admissibility of evidence in arbitration proceedings. See AM. ARB. ASS'N VOL. LAB. R. 28
(1975); Am. ARB. ASS'N COM. R. 30 (1973); W. Sturges, Arbitration - What is It?, 35
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1031 (1960). In cases where an objection to evidence is raised on the grounds
of relevance, arbitrators have a tendency to accept it "for what it's worth." Costikyan, Some
Observations on Arbitrators, 151 N.Y.L.J. 40, Feb. 27, 1964, at 1, col. 5.
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procedure. Since the arbitrator may resolve disputes and fashion
remedies not available in an action at law, the courts, in determin-
ing whether a stay of arbitration should be granted, should not
attempt to force the conflict into the mold of a traditional cause of
action. Consequently, the Court refused to label the action as one
in malpractice; instead, after viewing all the facts, it .determined
that although the damage was caused by the architects' negligence,
the claim was not barred by the malpractice statute of limitations
since it was also "substantially related to the subject matter of the
substantive agreement.' 132
Paver establishes the limitation period controlling arbitrable
disputes as that time within which an action could have been
commenced in court under any possible theory of suit. The deci-
sion, however, is limited to those instances where the contract itself
does not provide a shorter limitation period.133 The Court's selec-
tion of a generous limitation period 34 is consistent with the current
judicial trend encouraging arbitration as a means of reducing con-
gestion in the court system. The approach taken by the Court will
encourage insertion of specific time limits in contracts calling for
32 38 N.Y.2d at 676, 345 N.E.2d at 569, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 26. The Paver decision is
analogous to decisions involving arbitration of disputes arising under the uninsured motorist
endorsements on insurance policies. Typical of that line of cases are In re Ceccarelli, 204
N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960), and In re Travelers Indem. Co., 226 N.Y.S.2d
16 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962). In both cases the policyholders failed to demand arbitra-
tion within the statutory period applicable to tort actions. The insurers alleged that failure to
make timely demand precluded arbitration. The courts rejected the insurers' contention and
directed the parties to proceed to arbitration. The court reasoned that although the tortious
act of the uninsured motorist was the cause of the injury for which the claim was made
under the endorsement on the insurance contract, the action was based on the contractual
relationship between the insurer and policyholder, and hence required application of the
6-year statute of limitations. Accord, MVAIC v. McDonnell, 23 App. Div. 2d 773, 258
N.Y.S.2d 735 (2d Dep't 1965); MVAIC v. Goldberg, 65 Misc. 2d 778, 317 N.Y.S.2d 846
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970); see Comment, Arbitration, Statute of Limitations and Uninsured
Motorist Endorsements, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 528 (1970); The Biannual Survey, 40 ST. JoHN's L.
REV. 122, 128 (1965).
In Paver, the injury, allegedly caused by tortious malpractice, gave rise to a dispute
under the terms of the construction agreement. The Paver Court viewed the dispute as
cognizable in contract, and consequently, held the 6-year contract limitations period applica-
ble. The factual setting in the uninsured motorist cases may, however, be distinguished. In
the motorist cases, it was a third party's act that caused the injury, whereas in Paver, it was
the act of a party to the contract that produced the damage.
133 Where a specific time within which arbitration must be commenced is included in a
contract, it has been held that failure to comply therewith acts as a bar to the action. See
River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 110 N.E.2d 545 (1953).
134 In cases where the courts must decide between applicable limitation periods, they
have a tendency to resolve the issue in favor of the longer time period. Comment, Arbitration,
Statute of Limitations and Uninsured Motorist Endorsements, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 528, 530 (1970).
See, e.g., Dentists' Supply Co. v. Cornelius, 281 App. Div. 306, 119 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 306 N.Y. 624, 116 N.E.2d 238 (1953). Contra, Carr v. Liphsie, 8 App. Div. 2d 330, 187
N.Y.S.2d 564 (1st Dep't 1959) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 9 N.Y.2d 983, 176 N.E.2d 512, 218
N.Y.S.2d 62 (1961).
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arbitration and may also induce increased care in drafting and
utilizing arbitration clauses in form contracts.
A better solution, however, would be legislative enactment of a
single statute of limitations provision applicable to all arbitration
proceedings. 135 This would be the simplest method of standardiz-
ing the period of limitations for commencement of arbitration. It is
a logical extension of Paver's attempt to eliminate the difficulties
inherent in characterizing such actions as ex contractu or ex delicto,
and would provide greater certainty than Paver's selection process.
COURT OF CLAIMs ACT
Ct. Cl. Act § 10: Six-month limitations period and date ofjudgment time of
accrual applied to Dole claims.
Section 10 of the Court of Claims Act establishes jurisdictional
notice requirements for the assertion of causes of action against the
State. 36 Under subdivision 3 of section 10, a prospective plaintiff
has 90 days within which to file either a claim or a notice of
intention to file a claim for any action against the State grounded in
tort.1 37 Subdivision 4 provides a 6-month time period to file a
notice of intention or a claim against the State for contract actions
and any other claim not specifically covered by the other provi-
sions of section 10.313 Since the landmark decision in Dole v. Dow
135See also The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 530, 566 (1973). A provision
defining the limitation period for commencing arbitration proceedings at either 3 or 4 years
could easily be inserted in CPLR 7502(b). A statutory amendment would provide a more
effective resolution of this issue than does Paver's case law solution for the simple reason that
the appropriate statute of limitations would be defined with absolute certainty. Indeed, one
student author has suggested enactment of a single statute of limitations for both contract
and tort claims in all proceedings. Comment, Tort in Contract: A New Statute of Limitations, 52
ORE. L. REv. 91 (1972).
16 N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 10 (McKinney 1963). When asserting any cause of action against
the State, compliance with article II of the Court of Claims Act, which includes § 10, is a
prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. § 8.
'
3 7 Id. § 10(3) states:
A claim to recover damages for injuries to property or for personal injury caused by
the tort of an officer or employee of the state while acting as such officer or
employee, shall be filed within ninety days after the accrual of such claim unless the
claimant shall within such time file a written notice of intention to file a claim
therefor, in which event the claim shall be filed within two years after the accrual of
such claim.
131 Id. § 10(4) provides:
A claim for breach of contract, express or implied, and any other claim not
otherwise provided for by this section, over which jurisdiction has been conferred
upon the court of claims, shall be filed within six months after the accrual of such
claim, unless the claimant shall within such time file a written notice of intention to
file a claim therefor in which event the claim shall be filed within two years after
such accrual.
The other provisions of § 10 set notice and limitation periods for actions involving State
appropriation of lands or a right, title, or interest in land, id. § 10(1); a wrongful death
